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Abstract
A protocol annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty, regarding public broadcasting in member 
states, provides that member states are free to fund public service broadcasting as far as it 
does not affect competition in the European Union to an extent which would be contrary to the 
common interest. As a result of this condition, the European Commission carries out a propor-
tionality test to check if there is no overcompensation or disproportionate effects of public fund-
ing. It nonetheless does so by adopting a global control which considers all public broadcaster 
programmes as part of the public service remit. Such control is problematic because it does not 
take into account the distinction between commercial and public service programmes nor the 
actual quality of programmes. The Commission indeed focuses its control on the advertisement 
market, making sure that public broadcasters do not take advantage of public funding to lower 
the price of advertisement rates. The freedom enjoyed by public broadcasters to provide any 
types of programmes as far as they respect the advertisement market comes out to be contrary 
to citizen welfare.
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Introduction
The “Protocol on the system of public broadcasting in the member states”, an-
nexed to the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 states that the system of public broadcasting 
in the member states is directly related to the democratic, social and cultural needs of 
each society and to the need to preserve media pluralism. Indeed, numerous authors 
highlight the importance of broadcasting for the implementation of democracy, and even 
citizen rights (Murdock, 1999). Regarding this particular quality of public service broad-
casting, it provides that the member states are free to confer, define and organise the 
public service broadcasting and to fund it in consequences. It seems to legitimize the 
public funding of public broadcasting, in a European context where State aids are strictly 
controlled and supervised. Article 107 of the treaty on the functioning of European Union 
provides indeed the principle of incompatibility between treaties and state aids. 
This protocol seems to reflect a political consensus on the importance for the 
member states to finance their public broadcaster freely and especially to choose the 
type of financing. As stated by the Commission, in its Communication on the application 
of State aid rules to public service broadcasting, funding schemes can indeed be divided 
into two broad categories “single-funding” and “dual-funding”. The single-funding refers 
to those systems in which public service broadcasting is financed only by public funds, 
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mostly the license-fee. The dual funding, on the contrary, refers to those systems in 
which public service broadcasting (PSB) is financed by public funds and revenues from 
commercial advertisings (European Commission, 2009). These texts aimed to answer to 
the private broadcasters, which were arguing that dual funding was generating a breach 
on competition, because the public funding guaranteed the public broadcaster to pro-
pose some lower prices in the advertising market. Germany, in particular, was concerned 
with the possibility to keep on financing the public broadcasting with a “dual-funding”. 
The protocol allowed the Commission to state that it has no objection in principle to the 
choice of public funding made by the member states.
In spite of the general admissibility of public financing, the member states still have 
to respect some fundamental rules of the treaty, as respect of the public service mission 
and proportionality of the financing. The Amsterdam Protocol states indeed that the 
Members State have to define and entrust public service remit when they grant funding 
to the public service broadcasters, and they shall not affect trading conditions and com-
petition in the community to an extent which would be contrary to the common interest; 
this condition has been assimilated to the criteria of proportionality by the Commission 
(European Commission, 2009, point 38).
By the proportionality criteria, the Commission implies a test to know whether the 
State funding is justified in terms of public service obligations and to check if there is no 
overcompensation or disproportionate effects of public funding (European Commission, 
2009, point 40). This control should raise the issue of the demarcation, often blurred, 
between commercial and public service broadcasters (Craufurd-Smith, 2001, p. 5) but 
especially of the demarcation of public service mission and commercial programmes 
even within the programmes of the public service broadcasters. 
The whole issue of this article will be to understand how the commission carries 
on the control on the proportionality funding, when it has to respect the liberty of the 
member states to fund their public service broadcasters and how to ensure that the pub-
lic funding will actually help to implement “the democratic, social and cultural needs of 
each society”, as stated by the protocol. We will first present the necessity of public fund-
ing to ensure the freedom of the public service broadcasters regarding the market (1). We 
will then regard the definition of the public service remit, whether by the States or by the 
European law. We will see that the Commission allows a very wide definition of the pub-
lic service remits and effects a very light control of this definition (2). This allows public 
service broadcasters to fund programmes which draw near to commercial programmes 
(3). We will point out the commission’s method to control the proportionality of public 
funding and will show that it focuses more on the market than on public interest (4). 
Public funding, a necessity to ensure the independence of public broadcasters 
vis-a-vis the market
The commercial value of broadcasting is not disputable as stated by the Court of 
Justice in Sacchi (Case 155/73 Sacchi [1974] E.C.R. 409), and should fall into article 107 
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TFEU. However, in the Veronica case, the Court had judged that “the cultural-policy ob-
jectives are objectives relating to the public interest that a member state may legitimately 
pursue by formulating the statutes of his own broadcasting organizations in an appro-
priate manner” and that “the provisions of the treaties on the free movement of capital 
and the freedom to provide services must be interpreted as not precluding legislation 
of this type” (Case C-148/91 Rec Veronica Omroep Organisatie, [1993]). The protocol 
annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty is nothing more than the inscription in the treaties of 
the Veronica’s jurisprudence. It establishes a clear link between the public funding of the 
broadcasters and the respect of democratic, social and cultural needs of the society. 
In its “resolution on the role of public service broadcasting in a multi-media soci-
ety”, the European parliament also emphasizes on the importance of public funding for 
the Public Service Broadcasting (PSB), and goes further than the Commission, “calling 
on member states to ensure consistent, stable and realistic funding for PSBs, in order to 
ensure  their viability in a competitive market, but without being entirely dependent on 
advertising revenue and allowing them to fulfil their public service obligations” (Euro-
pean Parliament, 1996, point 39).
According to these texts, the public funding seems to be the normality, a necessity 
for public broadcasting not to be dependent on private advertisements. This condition 
has been put by several authors in literature, when they explain the negative impact 
advertisings has on the programmes. Serge Regourd explains that seeking for the larg-
est audience to attract more advertisers, the private television presents uniformity and 
standardized programmes (Regourd, 1989, p. 365)1. Pierre Bourdieu, in his book Sur la 
télévision, had already put that: 
Driven by competition on market shares, broadcasters use more and more 
the old strings of the sensation-seeking press, giving the first position, 
when not all place, to the miscellaneous facts, in brief, to everything which 
can satisfy pure curiosity and do not request particular skills, political in 
particular. (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 58)
A famous sentence of Patrick Le Lay, president of the French private broadcaster 
TF1 at the time, was really significant about the link between advertising and programme 
schedule: “our programmes have vocation to make viewers’ brains available: it means to 
entertain them, to distract them in order to prepare it for the advertising messages. What 
we sell to Coca-Cola is brain’s time availability” (Le Lay, 2004).  
In the light of the importance the television could have for the formation of an opin-
ion, the principle of inclusion in a society and for citizenship, it seems very important 
not to keep programmes depending on advertisers which would encourage bad-quality 
programmes. 
1 “By schematizing it with the risks of uniformity and standardization that it entails, public service television postulates a 
logic of the greatest diversity of publics with the constraints that it implies in terms of public service obligations. This is 
indeed the concrete translation in the field considered of the classical distinction between activities of greater profit and 
activities of greater service allowing to mark the specificity of the public sector” (Regourd, 1989, p. 365)
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Leaving the financing of broadcasting to advertisers would result in an absence of 
critical-rational debate, which is yet of paramount importance to democracy (Habermas, 
1989, p. 52). Market is seen as a threat against public sphere: on the market people pur-
sue their own private interest while in the public sphere, they direct their actions towards 
the will to find the right choice regarding the public good (Garhnam, 2000, p. 176). Gar-
nham, based on Habermas’ theory of public sphere, states that the strength of public 
service broadcasting is that “it (a) presupposes and then tries to develop in its practice 
a set of social relations which are distinctly political rather than economic, and (b) at the 
same time attempts to insulate itself from control by the state as opposed to, and this is 
often forgotten, political control” (Garnham quoted in Ramsey, 2010, p. 3).  
However, if public funding can be explained in this sector by sociological aspects, 
and in spite of the general admissibility of public financing, it still has to respect some 
fundamental rules of the treaty, as respect of the public service mission and proportional-
ity of the financing. Otherwise, these funds wouldn’t be considered as a State Aid allowed 
by the Treaty but as State Aid banned by the article 107§1 TFEU (Bartosch, 1999, p. 198 ; 
Craufurd-Smith, 2001, p. 5). This implies a clear definition of the public service remit. 
A very light control by the commission of the public service remit
According to the Amsterdam’s protocol, it is on the competence of the member 
state to confer the public service remit to the public broadcasters. The Member State are 
a priori free to define the mission the broadcasters have to fulfil. In its Communication on 
financing public broadcasting, the Commission states that “it is not for the Commission 
to decide whether a programme is a service of general economic interest, nor to question 
the nature or the quality of a certain product”. 
Same principles had been adopted earlier for Service of Economic General Interest: 
in its Communication on Services of General interest in Europe, the Commission stated 
that the determination of general interest services would be left to the member states, 
which would be subject only to a check for compatibility with “European Commitment” 
(European Commission, 2000). 
In the early stages of liberalization, the Court seemed to rely on the interpretation 
by national courts of their applicable legislation to interpret Article 86§2 (Case 127/73, 
BRT v. SABAM and NV Fonoir [1974] E.C.R. 313; Kovar, 1996). This resulted of the ab-
sence of a clear mandate or legal basis to develop a common definition of the public 
service (Karpenschif, 2008, p. 60). This can also be understood on the basis of political 
philosophy: “the European Union is law without State, whereas public service are inextri-
cably linked to the notion of State” (Stroffaës quoted in Rapport d’information sur le service 
public dans le cadre de l’Union européenne, 1995).The Court still notes in 2005 that “the 
Members State have wide discretion as to the definition of Service of Economic General 
Interest” (Case T17/02 Fred Olsen c/ Commission, [2005], point 216). 
However, the Court will in some case law became less reliant on the legal national 
framework and start checking the respect of the sense of the treaties. It is a matter for the 
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Commission, on the basis of article 106§3 of the TFEU to ensure that article 86 is prop-
erly applied, without abuse from the Members State. In order to perform this control, it 
is necessary to evaluate if the definition the Members State gave is not too wide. As this 
French author put it, “pragmatism and spill over effect are the reasons why the Commis-
sion decided to tackle this issue” (Karpenschif, 2008, p. 65). 
As a consequence on broadcasting sector, the Commission stated in its BBC New 
Decisions that the jurisdiction is competent to ensure that the public service remit as 
defined by the Members State falls into the concept of service of general economic inter-
est of article 86§2 (Commission Decision of September 29, [1999] in case NN 88/98, BBC 
News 24, [2000] O.J. C78/6 (the “BBC News 24 Decision”). In a 1991 sentence, the Court 
of first instance states for instance that publication of a magazine created to present the 
schedule programmes is without any rapport with the special RTE service public remit 
and as such can’t be funded by State funding (Case 1 68-69 RTE c/ Commission, 10 of 
July of 1991).  
However, it is only in case of manifest error of assessment that the Commission 
and the Court can censor a Member State (Case T106/95 FFSA c/ Commission of 27 Feb-
ruary of 1997). 
Later, in its communication on Financing Public Broadcasting, the Commission 
states explicitly that control must limit itself to the manifest error of assessment (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2009, point 48). Manifest error of assessment means that Court 
and Commission don’t grant themselves the right to control which activities do fall into 
public service remit, but which don’t fall into it. It implies that public entities are still free 
to determine the remit for the public broadcaster, but are submitted to new transpar-
ency obligations, in particular the mission imposed by them to the public broadcaster. 
The Commission notes however that “the definition of the public service remit would, 
however, be in manifest error if it included activities that could not reasonably be consid-
ered to meet – in the wording of the Amsterdam Protocol – the ‘democratic, social and 
cultural needs of each society’”. Through this definition of which falls into manifest error, 
a common definition of public service broadcasting which is based on the Amsterdam 
Protocol is already outlined (Carro-Marina, 1997), even if this definition is “at the mar-
gins” (Holmes, 2004)2. 
The Commission doesn’t seem to be very regarding in regard to the activities which 
don’t fall into “the democratic, social and cultural needs of each society”. On the con-
trary, in its communication, it appears unclear and even contradictory. It first claims that 
it is in the interests of member states to be as precise as possible in the definition of the 
obligations imposed upon public service broadcasters; otherwise it would not be able to 
grant any exemption under Article 86(2).(European Commission, 2009, point 46). How-
ever, later, the Commission states that:
At the same time, given the specific nature of the broadcasting sector, 
and the need to safeguard the editorial independence of the public service 
2 “The commission asserts only a right to control the definition of public broadcasting at the margins, guarding against 
abusive interpretations which cannot credibly be related to the democratic, social, and cultural needs of each society.” 
(Holmes, 2004)
Comunicação e Sociedade, vol. 30, 2016
456
Financing the public service broadcasting under European Union law . Pauline Trouillard
broadcasters, a qualitative definition entrusting a given broadcaster with 
the obligation to provide a wide range of programming and a balanced and 
varied broadcasting offer is generally considered, in view of the interpreta-
tive provisions of the Amsterdam Protocol, legitimate under Article 86(2) 
(point 47). 
Therefore, the Commission accepts the indetermination of public service remit as 
defined by the members state. This can be explained as stated by the cultural and en-
tertaining values of audiovisual sector, which the definition can be subjective because 
it is qualitative rather than quantitative. All the same, it is paradoxical. The definition 
could hardly be as precise as possible if it can limit itself to a global definition which 
only includes the necessity of a widespread programme schedule and a varied and bal-
anced programming. Furthermore, this global definition raises the issue of the status 
of entertainment programs and programs which can also be available on commercial 
channels. The Court of First Instance answers this doubt saying that “the legitimacy of 
such a widely defined public service remit rests upon the qualitative requirements for the 
services offered by a public service broadcaster”. 
It means that whatever the nature of the programmes, news, educational, televi-
sion games, sports, news, movies, the qualitative criteria is what distinguishes them 
from the programs offered by the private. The fact that these same programs are also 
diffused by private broadcasting is not problematic, as public broadcaster can be seen 
as establishing a ‘benchmark’ regarding the global offer, helping maintaining high stand-
ards of quality in all the channels (Craufurd-Smith, 2001, p. 16). Indeed, these qualita-
tive criteria are “the justification for the existence of broadcasting SGEIs in the national 
audiovisual sector”. There is “no reason for a widely defined broadcasting SGEI which 
sacrifices compliance with those qualitative requirements in order to adopt the conduct 
of a commercial operator” (T-442/03, SIC v Commission, paragraph 211). 
This definition seems to answer to a broad conception of public service broadcast-
ing, much broader than the market failure model advocated by numerous authors. This 
model was first highlighted by Peacock in his report on the future of BBC, in 1986. For 
this liberal, close to Margaret Thatcher, the public intervention would be legitimated in 
the broadcasting sector only by filling the gap left by private broadcasters on the market. 
This meant that Public broadcasters shouldn’t propose the same programmes as the 
private broadcasters, even if the quality level was different. This model was put in ques-
tion by others authors who claim that Public broadcasting is not about narrow market 
failure, because it would confine the public broadcasters to a ghetto, providing very elitist 
programmes and letting apart the popular needs of the majority of the population. Ac-
cording to these authors, given the impact of broadcasting in shaping the mentality of 
one country, the definition of the aims of this medium can’t be left to the market. 
However, the competition with commercial broadcasting led the public service 
broadcasters to adopt the codes of the private sector (Albarède, 2013, p. 40).
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The convergence between public broadcasters and private broadcasters
In order to verify this assertion we undertook a brief comparison between public 
programming and private programming in the French television, based on a sociologi-
cal TV analysis3. Numerous comparative studies have compared public and private TV 
programming, to find out if there are still enough effective differences to legitimize the 
existence of public channels (see for instance Krüger, 1990). These studies tend to focus 
on two main methods – a comparison of the programming schedule and a comparison 
between the content of programmes. For the purpose of this study we have decided to 
focus on the comparison between two programming schedules at the same time of the 
day. In order to do that, we used the very typical programming schedule of one private 
channel, TF1, and one public channel, France 2, and put them in a tableau to be able to 
do a hour by hour comparison of the two (excluding the evening programmes which 
change each day). 
The main difference between the two channels is that while TF1 programming 
schedule during a day is mainly composed by american fiction (43,2%), France 2 pro-
gramming schedule is mainly composed by magazines (50%). For instance, the three 
main programmes of the afternoon are american fictions in TF1 while in France 2 they 
are magazines. 
This classification by genres of programmes is questioned by some authors, be-
cause of the heterogeneity of the criteria used by the channels to classify them (Bra-
chet, 2005). This classification would depend on two antagonistic things: the willing of 
the producer and the understandings of the viewers (Jost & Leclerc, 1994, p. 53). For 
instance, in the magazines, France 2 includes one talk-show about everyday life, one 
about personal issues, and one documentary-fiction. Even if the three programmes are 
classified as magazines by the channels, the viewers will not perceive them the same 
way. This trend of television to mix genres leads, according to F. Lahire, to the jamming 
of legitimate and illegitimate cultures. For instance, one magazine could aim to instruct 
the viewers while some others are purely entertainment. As a result, it is not possible to 
claim that the public broadcaster France Television proposes a better programming than 
TF1 simply because it presents magazines instead of fiction.  
We have also decided to focus our attention on content analysis of the mentioned 
programmes.
Berelson first defined content analysis as “a research technique for the objective, 
systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” (Be-
relson, 1952, p. 18). The systematic method is opposed to the impressionistic one (see 
Lasswell, 1942, p. 15; Leites & De Sola Pools, 1942, p. 2). When using impressionistic 
method, individuals characterize content without specifying the criteria that they use 
while systematic procedures are used to make the criteria of judgment as explicit as pos-
sible. Systematic content analysis attempts to show objectively the nature and relative 
strength of the stimuli applied to the readers or the listeners (Lasswell, 1942, p. 15). The 
3 Study to be continued for Italy and UK television. 
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difficulty in this method is evidently to design the preliminary coding categories in which 
will be fitted the content to analyse (Franzosi, 2008). It must of course be designed given 
the specific research needs of the investigator, but the most typical reason given for the 
choice of a specific coding scheme is its use in past research (Berelson, 1952).
We decided to start our analysis by an easily identifiable genre: quizz games. 
The quizz games represent 29,1% of a day’s programming schedule in France 2 and 
21,4% in TF1 (excluding the programming of the evening), but they are supposed to be 
qualitatively different in the public and private broadcasters. According to the French 
Regulatory Authority, the main difference is that while the private sectors attracts viewers 
and players with the enticement of big amounts of money, the public sector is supposed 
to rely on the knowledges of the players. (Lettre du CSA, 2008, p. 214). In order to design 
the coding categories, we relied on the criteria emphasized by the regulatory authority, 
taking into account the importance given to the money in the game, as well as the rela-
tive knowledge of the players. 
In a sociological analysis of a game set in France 2, Mot de passe, we counted the 
number of times the presenter makes references to the amount of money the candidates 
can win. During the 30 minutes of the programme, the 20 000 euros the candidate can 
win are mentioned 12 times, once each 2-3 minutes. The playing rules are explained in 
20 seconds after 4 minutes (out of 30) of the programme. The proper game is always 
interrupted by some entertaining commentaries of the guests, which make us think that 
the knowledge of the players is not the most important thing, contrary to what the CSA 
claimed. 
In the following game of the programming schedule, N’oubliez pas les paroles, the 
presenter also highlights the important amount of money that the candidates can win, 
at the very beginning of the game. This amount of money is linked to the capacity of the 
player to answer the karaoke questions. During the game, the presenter makes four ref-
erences to the amount of money the player could win. Emphasis is put during the game 
on the personality of the players; a lot of questions are asked to them about their life and 
the game is always interrupted by commentaries. 
In the private channel TF1 the quizz games were Une famille en Or and Le juste 
prix, which are clearly geared towards gaining the biggest amount of money. The content 
analysis for these games didn’t result in a real difference between the programmes of the 
public broadcaster and the ones of the private broadcaster. 
Point 53 of the Communication however states that: 
it is not for the Commission to judge on the fulfilment of quality standards: 
it must be able to rely on appropriate supervision by the Member States of 
compliance by the broadcaster with its public service remit including the 
qualitative standards set out in that remit. (European Commission, 2009)
But what if the authority entrusted with the function to supervise the quality stand-
ards doesn’t comply with its mission, as it is the case in France and Italy? (Trouillard, 
2016). Which other authority besides the Commission could control the quality stand-
ard? And if the quality standard is not respected, is the public funding still legitimate? 
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In one of its decisions the Commission validates the definition of public service re-
mit made by France in its law even if this definition is very wide, (point 56) and in a latter 
point, the Commission asserts that the definition is more precise, quoting the “pluralis-
tic expression of different trends of thoughts and opinions, independence and pluralism 
of information, adjustment to technological change”, etc., but doesn’t highlight the fact 
that TF1 also has to respect of all of these “public service tasks” but doesn’t benefit from 
any public funding to do so. 
A control of the Commission focusing on the market rather than on public 
interest
The Commission states in its communication that it has “no objection in principle 
to the choice of a dual financing scheme rather than a single funding scheme” (point 57). 
This formulation implies that single funding is the “normal funding” and dual funding 
is just accepted by the Commission. In the ruling of the Commission, it seems that dual 
funding could be a problem, unlike the single funding, which is direct state funding. Yet, 
in the principles of the European Union, and in virtue of the prohibition of state aids, it 
is the public funding which is problematic and not the private funding, which is consid-
ered as the norm. As a consequence, in the light of article 106§2, public funding can only 
be justified by a state conferred mission to undertake a specific task. The single funding 
would therefore mean that each program of the public broadcaster is a public service 
program which is directly “related to the democratic, social and cultural needs of each so-
ciety and to the need to preserve media pluralism”. By contrast, it could be said that the 
advertising funding enables public broadcasters to legitimize the commercial programs 
which don’t answer the criteria of public service remit (Regourd, 2008, p. 112). Even if the 
criteria of proportionality is very difficult to meet and impossible to check, even with the 
dual funding, it would legitimize a grey area between public service program and com-
mercial programs diffused by the public broadcasters (Regourd, 2008, p. 113). 
The second problems refers to calculation criteria adopted by the Commission to 
check if the proportionality is respected. Bavasso states in 2002 that:
the Commission has vowed to be vigilant in relation to distortions which 
may occur as a consequence of (or which are simply facilitated by) the exist-
ence of State funding and which are not necessary for the attainment of the 
public service mission. (Bavasso, 2002, p. 340)
However, once again, we can doubt it in this the case. The Commission adopts 
a very large and imprecise criteria to check if the public funding is proportional to the 
public service remit. For instance, in its Commission decision of 10 December 2003 on 
State aid implemented by France to France 2 and France 3, the Commission states that: 
France 2 and France 3 carry on both a public service activity and commercial 
activities, either in- house or via subsidiaries. Only the cost of the channels’ 
public service activity, which includes all the costs necessary for making and 
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transmitting their programmes, is eligible for financial compensation from 
the State. (Commission decision of 10 december 2003 on State Aid imple-
mented by France to France 2 and France 3,OJEU, 8/12/2004, L361/21). 
Due to an incapacity to measure exactly the cost of the public service remit, the 
Commission adopts a global calculation mode which includes all the programs diffused 
by French public broadcasters. The same reasoning is used in the commission refuses to 
make a difference between commercial programs and “public service programs”, which 
indeed, would be very difficult to do. As a consequence, the cost of the public service 
remit is based on a simple subtraction between commercial revenues and total costs of 
the public broadcasters (Table 4 of the decision).
It seems that this calculation mode is inspired by the Amsterdam Protocol. This 
protocol talks about a public service mission, rather than “public service obligations” or 
even “service of economic general interest” the public broadcaster are entrusted by. The 
difference between the two expressions could be than the former one is a global mission, 
whereas the latter one is specific and precise. But why, in that case, favoring the single 
funding rather than the dual funding? 
On the one hand, as explained in the introduction, the preference for single fund-
ing can be explained by the characteristics of the sector: public funding enables public 
broadcasters not to be dependent, in their programming, of the advertisers. This could 
lead to a deterioration of programming quality and that’s why the Amsterdam protocol 
protects the possibility of public funding by the Members State. But we can totally imag-
ine a system in which the majority of the funding would come from the State and a little 
part from the advertisers. This wouldn’t lead to a deterioration of the programs as long 
as the public broadcasting did not get the majority of its funding from advertising. 
On the other hand, the funding by the advertisers could cause prejudice to the 
private broadcasters and distort competition. That is the argument used by the private 
broadcasters when they intent a request in front of the Commission. In the decision pre-
cited of the Commission, TF1 raised the issue that thanks to the aids received, France 2 
and France 3 were able to lower the price of advertising, reducing as a consequence the 
revenues of their competitors, which were forced to adjust. The Commission decided 
to check the possibility of a state induced market distortion and in order to do that it 
used the gross rating point (GRP), which is defined as the average number of contacts 
achieved by an advertising campaign out of 100 people in the target population. In the 
ensuing decision, the Commission notes that the GRP price of France Television is not 
significantly inferior to TF1’s so it refused to consider that public funding is contrary to 
the treaties because it doesn’t entail the competition in the advertising market. This 
calculation mode to establish if public funding is contrary to the Treaties raises some im-
portant issues. It raises the issue of the goal and the aims of competition law as stated by 
the treaties. As recalled by Prosser, “the chief, and according to many commentators, the 
only goal for competition law is the promotion of consumer welfare through maximising 
efficiency” (Prosser, 2004, p. 18). Amato ads: 
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what is to be understood as efficient and hence as consistent with con-
sumer welfare is any conduct or situation that transfers to the consumer’s 
benefit qualitative improvements in manufactures or in costs reduction, 
without giving anyone room to “restrict” the market. (Amato, 1997, pp. 21-22) 
The main goal for competition law would according to these authors be the pro-
motion of consumer welfare. It is, without doubt, the paradigm supported by the british 
regulatory authority, Ofcom, which has focused its role on the respect of competition law, 
to further the interests of the citizen and the consumer (Lunt & Livingstone, 2012, p. 49). 
However, Posner, one of the main representatives of the Chicago School recognizes that 
“efficiency is the sole objective of antitrust law, but competition a mediate goal that will 
often be close enough to allow the Court to look no further” (Posner, 2001, p. 29).
It seems that in the case of public service broadcasting, the Courts should have 
looked further. Indeed, simply controlling if the public funding doesn’t entail the market 
principles makes the Commission and the Courts show preference for a single type of 
funding, which is not justified by an efficient delivery of the public broadcasters. Indeed, 
these tend to act as commercial broadcasters in the market without any control by the 
Commission or respect for their obligations. 
Public funding, which bases its legitimacy on the necessity for public broadcast-
ers to act differently from the private broadcasters is used, at least in two of the studied 
countries, France and Italy, to broadcast some commercial-tendency programs. In the 
broadcasting case, we could say that the competition law is respected, because the pub-
lic funding doesn’t entail the competition in the market, but the consumer’s welfare is 
not taken into account. 
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